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Mens Rea, Due Process and the Burden of
Proving Sanity or Insanity
INTRODUCTION
Courts in the United States have long recognized that before
guilt can be found in the commission of a common law type
offense, an actus rea in union with a mens rea must be present.
While the idea of the necessity of a combination of an actus rea
with a mens rea determined prior to a finding of guilt has re-
mained constant, the conception of the mental element of the
common law crime, the mens rea or morally blameworthy in-
tent, has not remained unchanged. For example, an indian who
is posted as a sentry to guard an encampment and who shoots
and kills an escaping figure under the mistaken belief that it is
an evil spirit seeking to do harm would probably not have been
convicted when the concept of mens rea was based largely on
the morality of the action. Today, however, he would be guilty of
at least manslaughter.' The role of the intent element in crime
has been further confused by the development of modern strict
liability offenses.2 This uncertainty surrounding the modern
definition of the mens rea has had a direct influence on the
direction which both the state and federal courts have taken in
determining the relevance of sanity or insanity to the existence
of the morally blameworthy intent element of a crime. The
different conclusions arrived at by the jurisdictions have given
rise to distinctly different procedural approaches for handling
the insanity defense.
Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia currently
place the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the
1. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1019 (1932).
2. The concept of strict liability in crime presents a methodological prob-
lem for a defense of insanity based on lack of intent in all criminal activity, but
as pointed out by the Colorado Supreme Court, "No one has yet contended that
mental capacity to commit a crime is not a material element of the crime of
murder, or any other offense." People v. District Court, 165 Col. 253, 266, 439
P.2d 741, 748 (1968).
evidence on the defendant.3 The basis for the responsibility
assumed by the defendant in these jurisdictions is either: (1) that
sanity is deemed relevant to assessing the severity of punish-
ment rather than the presence of intent, or (2) that while sanity
can be considered during the guilt phase of a trial, sanity need
not be proven by the state per se because the prosecution can
show the existence of the requisite intent without proving sani-
ty. The alternate approach adopted by twenty-eight states and
the federal courts4 requires that, once the issue of sanity has
been raised, the prosecution bear the burden of proving the
defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, as with any other
element of the crime. Under this view, the prosecution is gener-
ally entitled initially to rely on the presumption of sanity to
satisfy its burden and need only make an affirmative proof of
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt when insanity is put in issue
by the defense. 5 In some jurisdictions even the prosecution's
case may be sufficient to raise the sanity issue.' In Rivera v.
State,7 the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to
reconcile the differing conclusions as to the relevance of sanity
to the requisite mens rea of a crime, and, at the same time,
determine whether constitutional requirements of due process
of law mandate the federal and majority approach to proof of
sanity.
Carmen Nereida Rivera had been charged with first degree
murder. She was convicted of second degree murder. She then
appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court of Delaware, 8
charging as error that: (1) Title 11 Section 401 of the Delaware
Code,9 classifying mental illness as an affirmative defense
3. Note, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of
Insanity to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B. UNIV. L. REv. 499, 503 n.35
(1976).
4. Id. at 505 n.41; See also Note, Insanity-The Burden of Proof, 30 Lou. L.
REV. 117, n.1 and 2 (1969); Annot. 17 A.L.R. 3d Supp. 6, 6-17 (1976); annot. A.L.R.
3d 146, 154 (1968).
5. Battle v.U.S., 209 U.S. 36 (1908).
6. Annot. 17 A.L.R. 3d 146, 154 (1968).
7. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
8. Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d 561 (1976).
9. 11 DEL. CODE § 401 (Michie 1974) provides:
§ 401. Defendant's mental illness or mental defect as affirmative de-
fense; verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity'.
(a) In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that,
at the time of the conduct charged, as a result of mental illness or
mental defect, the accused lacked substantial capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or lacked sufficient will-power to
choose whether he would do the act or refrain from doing it.
(b) If the defendant prevails in establishing the affirmative defense
provided in subsection (a) of this section, the trier of facts shall return a
verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity'.
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which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence under Title 11 Section 304 of the Delaware Code,10 was
violative of due process1 ' and (2) a jury instruction limiting the
mitigating defense of extreme emotional distress to the crime of
first degree murder was violative of due process and equal
protection. 12 The Delaware Supreme Court sustained the con-
stitutionality of Title 11 Section 401 of the Delaware Code,'13 but
found Carmen Rivera's second defense to be good. 14 The court
then reversed and remanded the case with instructions to strike
the murder conviction and to enter a judgment of conviction for
manslaughter. 15 Rivera thereupon appealed her conviction to
the United States Supreme Court questioning the constitution-
ality of the Delaware statutes requiring a criminal defendant
raising an insanity defense to prove mental illness by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 16 Her appeal was dismissed by the
Court for want of a substantial federal question.17 Justice Ste-
vens noted probable jurisdiction and Justices Brennan and
Marshall filed a dissenting memorandum opinion.'8
In the aftermath of Hicks v. Miranda, 9 and its affirmation of
the constitutional rule, the Court's summary dismissal of Rivera
v. State2 0 establishes precedential weight to the constitutionali-
10. 11 DEL. CODE § 304 (Michie 1974) provides:
§ 304. Defendant's affirmative defenses; prove by preponderance of
evidence;
(a) When a defense declared by this Criminal Code or by another
statute to be an affirmative defense is raised at trial, the defendant has
the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence.
(b) Unless the court determines that no reasonable juror could find an
affirmative defense established by a preponderance of the evidence
presented by the defendant, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruc-
tion that the jury must acquit him if they find the affirmative defense
established by a preponderance of the evidence.
(c) An affirmative defense is established by a preponderance of the
evidence when the jury is persuaded that the evidence makes it more
likely than not that each element of the affirmative defense existed at
the required time.
11. 35 A.2d at 561.
12. Id. at 562.
13. Id. at 563.
14. Id.
15 * Id.
16. Rivera v. State, 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
20. 351 A.2d 561 (1976).
ty of statutes requiring a criminal defendant raising an insanity
defense to prove mental illness or defect by a preponderance of
the evidence.
Although the majority in Rivera21 declined to hear argument
on the case, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, ar-
gued 22 that the time had come to reconsider the wisdom of
restricting the holding in Davis v. State23 to the federal courts as
had been done in Leland v. Oregon.24 The Leland decision was
predicated upon the Court's reluctance "(T)o interfere with Ore-
gon's determination of its policy with respect to the burden of
proof on the issue of insanity since we cannot say that policy
violates generally accepted concepts of basic standards of jus-
tice".25 Subsequent to that decision the Supreme Court has, on
several occasions, 26 held that state prosecutions must, to com-
port with the due process requirements of the constitution,
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact essential to consti-
tute the crime charged. By summarily disposing of Rivera,27 the
majority was apparently remiss in overlooking a very ripe and
critical issue. If sanity is an element necessary to a person's guilt
as held in Davis,28 it is apparent that in order to insure due
process of law, the prosecution should, just as it must with any
other element of the offense charged, bear the burden of prov-
ing beyond a reasonable doubt the sanity of the defendant once
the issue has been raised. The key to the question revolves
around the meaning of criminal intent. Before any due process
argument can be made, therefore, it is necessary to understand
whether sanity has a material influence on the presence of in-
tent. This is done by first briefly analyzing the meaning of mens
rea at common law, and the meaning adopted by the majority of
state and federal courts, and second by determining what the
term has come to mean in a minority of the jurisdictions. Of the
minority approaches, two states, California and Delaware, have
been selected as representative of the views to be examined in
more detail. After these two minority views have been fully
explored, this paper will again focus on the requirements of due
process.
21. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
22. Id. at 227.
23. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
24. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
25. Id. at 799.
26. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Lynch v. Overholster, 369 U.S.
705 (1962); In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969); Mullaney v. Wilber, 421 U.S. 684
(1975).
27. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
28. 160 U.S. at 485.
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II
THE CONCEPT OF INTENT AS A NECESSARY
ELEMENT To A CRIME
A. At Common Law
Up until at least the twelfth century, feudal criminal law was
based largely on strict liability. The conception of mens rea, as
used in a modern sense, was virtually non-existent. It was poss-
ible in certain cases for criminal liability to attach irrespective
of the actor's state of mind. The concept of a morally blamewor-
thy state of mind, as an essential element of a crime, was an
evolutionary development occurring during the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries under the-influences of the cannon and
Roman law.29 By the eighteenth century, the concept of the
mental element in crime had developed sufficiently so that defi-
nite defenses based upon the lack of moral blameworthiness
had been established. It was at this point that Blackstone pre-
sented these defenses in a logical order in his Commentaries.30
The state's right to inflict punishment depended not only on the
occurrence of the Overt act constituting the offense charged, but
additionally upon the simultaneous presence of a vicious will.31
An involuntary act could not induce any guilt. Culpability was
dependent upon the existence of the will to make a choice either
to do or to avoid the overt act.32 The absence of this choice
between committing or avoiding the criminal act or omission
excused the idiot or lunatic from criminal liability at the com-
mon law. The extant law recognized that such a person suffered
from a defective or vitiated understanding which excused any
criminal guilt.33 The non compus person was incapable of com-
mitting even treason itself.34
29. For a short history of mens rea in the early common law See: Sayre,
Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932); Levitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of
Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. REV. 117 (1922); Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at
Common Law, 6 CAM. L.J. 31 (1936); Remington and Helstad, The Mental Ele-
ment in Crime-A Legislative Problem, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 644, 648-52.
30. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book IV § 20-
34 (4th ed. 1899).
31. Id. at § 21.
32. Id.
33. Id. at § 24.
34. Id.
B. The Federal And Majority Conception
The common law requirement of a union between the crimi-
nal act and a criminal intent before punishment can be legiti-
mately inflicted upon the accused, was subsequently recognized
by the courts in the United States.35 As the United States Su-
preme Court stated in Morissette v. United States:36
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflict-
ed by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal
and persistent in nature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will, and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individu-
al to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental
element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as
the child's familiar exculpatory 'But I didn't mean to' and has afford-
ed the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deter-
rence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the
motivation for public prosecution.
37
Upon this precept early courts found that the proof of this
intent was necessarily on the prosecution. Some courts then
went on to reason that if, in fact, a criminal intent is an essential
element in every crime, and if, by reason of insanity a person is
incapable of forming any intent, he cannot be regarded by law
as guilty.38 These courts consider the mental element, mens rea
or morally blameworthy intent to be something entirely differ-
ent from mere immorality of motive.39 They recognize the exist-
ence of the common law concept of a voluntary will, the ability
to freely exercise a choice between alternative modes of behav-
ior, as an essential element of the crime.4 0
35. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951); Smith v. People, 361
U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
36. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
37. Id. at 250-51.
38. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); Commonwealth v. Pomeray,
117 Mass. 143 (1875).
39. In Shelvlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910), the Supreme
Court recognized the possibility of strict liability crimes. In United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), the Court upheld the conviction where the defendant
had violated a federal narcotics law and was ignorant of the facts that made his
act a crime. For a criticism of strict liability crimes in general see Hippard, The
Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault; An Argument For a
Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1039 (1973).
40. The Supreme Court of the United States has on several occasions recog-
nized the importance of the intent element of a crime: "The existence of a mens
rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American
Criminal jurisprudence." Smith v. People, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). The single statement by the Court in
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1967), to the effect that the Court has never
articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens rea cannot be considered
controlling. Powell was convicted of being drunk in a public place and the court
was careful to note he was not being convicted for being a chronic alcoholic. For
a review of mens rea and cases involving alcohol or drug addiction see; Robin-
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The conception of blameworthiness or moral guilt is necessarily based
upon a free mind voluntarily choosing evil rather than good; there can
be no criminality in the sense of moral shortcoming if there is no
freedom of choice or normality of will capable of exercising a free
choice. 41
In these jurisdictions, therefore, the essential element of crim-
inal responsibility, the capacity to exercise a voluntary will, is
absent if the defendant is insane.
C. The Minority Conception
A minority of jurisdictions, even though adopting the precept
of a union of a criminal act with a criminal intent, found that the
general presumption of sanity required that it be overcome by a
preponderance of evidence presented by the defendant.42 One
justification for placing the responsibility of disproving sanity
on the defendant was the nature of the insanity defense.
1. California
By viewing a defense of insanity offered by itself as a plea of
nonamenability, the issue of the mental element of the offense is
never reached. Pure pleas of nonamenability admit, for pur-
poses of the plea, the commission of the crime and all of its
elements. The defense is not that a crime has not been commit-
ted, but rather for other reasons no criminal liability should
attach to the offense. In California, a jurisdiction in which a
plea of insanity by itself is considered a nonamenable plea,43 for
example, an act or omission does not constitute a criminal of-
fense unless there exists a union of the action and an intent.44
Yet, if the defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, and
joins with it another plea or pleas, he is first tried on the merits
of such other plea or pleas. For purposes of trial on such other
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1967); Driver
v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966) (alcohol); Kelly v. United States, 361
F.2d 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (alcohol); Gaster v. District of Columbia, 351 F.2d 50
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (alcohol); United States v. Lindsey, 324 F. Supp. 55 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (narcotics); After Powell a lack of mens rea still seems to remain a valid
defense.
41. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 993-94 (1932).
42. State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43,36 Am. Dec. 398 (1841); People v. Myers, 20 Cal.
518 (1852).
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016 (West Supp. 1977).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1972) provides: "In every crime or public
offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal
negligence."
pleas, the defendant is conclusively presumed sane and cannot
question the absence of the general mental element of the crime
as a result of his insanity. If the defendant is found guilty on the
other plea or pleas, or has pleaded not guilty by reason of insani-
ty alone, then the issue of sanity is tried separately and apart
from the defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged.
4
In reality, once a plea of insanity has been entered, the require-
ments of California Penal Code Section 20, that an intent be
present, is never satisfactorily addressed during trial on the
issue of guilt.
Generally in California, the intent with which the unlawful act
was done must be proven as well as the material facts stated in
the indictment. 46 This intent can be proved by evidence directly
or indirectly establishing the fact, or more commonly, with the
use of presumptions. Under California Evidence Code Section
665, a person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences
of his voluntary act. Further, an unlawful intent is presumed
from the doing of an unlawful act.47 Both of these presumptions
are expressly inapplicable in proving the specific intent element
of any crime.48 These presumptions simply indicate that when a
person does an act, he "intends" to do that act. What then is
meant by the word "intend"? Does it involve some judgment on
the morality of the action contemplated? California Penal Code
Section 7(1) defines the word "willfully", when applied to the
"intent" with which an act is done or omitted, as implying
"(s)imply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make
the omission referred to .... It does not require any intent to
violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage".
If a willful intention does not convey the meaning of an immoral
act, certainly the use of the word intent without the adjective
cannot convey a stronger meaning on the morality of an action.
A more reasonable interpretation of the word is that the act or
omission of the person was the result of a free mind voluntarily
choosing between alternative modes of behavior which may be
good or evil. The presumptions regarding intent embrace this
interpretation when they exclude themselves from applicability
to elements of specific intent.49 The issues of specific intent are
not directed at choosing a particular course of conduct over
another, rather, they are addressed to the intention of particular
consequences to be the result of specific acts. It follows that the
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1977).
46. People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 681 (1866).
47. CAL. EVID. CODE § 688 (West 1968).
48. See note 47, supra.
49. Id.
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intent required in combination with the overt act refers to the
voluntariness of the action and not the morality of the act itself
and that the mens rea requirement under California law is that
the individual have the capacity to voluntarily select a mode of
behavior. Even though it appears that culpability is directly
dependent upon the existence of a free will, evidence directly
relating to the presence of such mental capabilities is excluded
on the basis that it operates only to excuse the crime and does
not determine whether a crime has been committed at all.
5 0
California recognizes, however, that "a person who cannot
comprehend the nature and quality of his act is not responsible
therefore".5 1 "An act done in the absence of the will is not any
more the behavior of the actor than is an act done contrary to
his will". 52 California law expressly states that insane persons
are incapable of committing crimes.5 3 Legal insanity in Calif or-
nia denotes a diseased or deranged condition of the mind which
either makes a person incapable of knowing or understanding
the nature and quality of his act or makes a person incapable of
knowing or understanding that the act was wrong.54 A person
who is insane may very possibly understand the nature of his
act yet still not be capable of understanding its quality or
whether the act itself is right or wrong. That process involves
the exercise of a voluntary will, freely distinguishing between
alternative actions. The process of contemplating between right
and wrong is the intent element necessary both at common law
and in California before a person engaging in criminal activity
can be found guilty of a crime. Instead of focusing on whether
there was this kind of voluntariness about the act, the courts
50. People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 47, 273 P.767, 772 (1928), held:
It follows, therefore, that any evidence tending to establish the insanity
of the defendant under his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the
time of the commission of the homicide, other than evidence of the
immediate circumstances of the offense, would have been irrelevant
and immaterial on the trial of the general issue as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant raised by the general plea of not guilty. As
the statute accorded the defendant his full right, and ample opportuni-
ty to submit to a jury his plea of insanity at the time of the commission
of the offense, in excuse of his act and as a reason why no penalty of the
law should be visited upon him, it follows that the trial court correctly
excluded the evidence on the trial of the general issue.
51. People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943).
52. Id.
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1972).
54. CAL Jic No. 4.00 (West 1970).
overlook this aspect of insanity, preferring to use it as an excuse
to preclude punishment. It is true that for humanitarian rea-
sons55 it may not be morally right to punish the insane. A policy
decision should not be controverted, however, into a justifica-
tion for denying a person the protection gained from the neces-
sity that all elements to a crime be proven before guilt can be
imputed, including the mens rea element. Even though evidence
of insanity has been prevented from entering into the guilty
phase of the trial, it has been recognized that even a "(C)onclu-
sive persumption of sanity ... is not a conclusive capacity to
commit a crime". 56 Indeed, California acknowledges the impor-
tance of the mental element of intent even while refusing to view
the issue of sanity as important in a determination of guilt." By
definition, a person who is found to be insane, under the Califor-
nia definition of insanity, does not have the capacity to voluntar-
ily exercise a free will. Without that capability, there can never
be a union of the intent and the overt act necessary to constitute
the offense. Logically, therefore, the issue of sanity is a vitally
important factor in a trial of guilt. There is no guilt in the
absence of the mens rea requirement. 58 If a person does not
possess a free will to choose between alternative actions as a
result of his insanity, he cannot have the requisite intent. Thus,
he is not guilty of any offense.5 9
2. Delaware
Not all states view the defense of insanity as a mere plea of
nonamenability. 0 Delaware appears to avoid the problems
which a jurisdiction like California encounters by allowing the
55. People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 678, 273 P. 767 (1866).
56. People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 348, 202 P.2d 53, 64 (1949).
57. It would seem elementary that a plea of not guilty to a charge of
murder puts in issue the existence of the particular mental states which
are essential elements of the two degrees of murder and of manslaugh-
ter .... Accordingly, it appears only fair and reasonable that defend-
ant should be allowed to show that in fact, subjectively, he did not
possess the mental state or states in issue.
People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 733, 336 P.2d 492, 502-03 (1959)
Whenever a particular mental state, such as a specific intent, is by
statute made an essential element of a crime, that specific state must be
proved like any other fact.
People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 350, 202 P.2d 53, 65 (1949).
58. Again, we are not referring to strict liability offenses.
59. Yet this is not to say insane persons may not be confined. Even Black-
stone recognized that though an insane person lacked the mental element neces-
sary to be guilty of an offense, his confinement might be necessary to protect
society.
2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book IV § 25 (4th ed.
1899).
60. State v. Murphy, 338 Mo. 291, 90 S.W.2d 103 (1936).
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defendant to introduce evidence of insanity at the guilt phase of
trial.6 Further, Delaware requires that the people prove, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, every material element of a crime.62 It
also requires that a person's guilt must be based on conduct
which includes a voluntary act.63 Under Delaware's definition of
insanity, however, the voluntariness of the defendant's actions
is assumed and must be disproved by the defense by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 64 Relying on the presumption of sanity
which the defendant must overcome, the prosecution is not re-
quired to offer proof of any criminal intent. The rationale in
jurisdictions abiding by this rule is that the sanity of the defend-
ant is not an element of the crime. As such, the absence of sanity
cannot be used to deny the mental element of the crime required
under Delaware law.
The Delaware Code provides that insanity exists where "(T)he
accused lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his conduct or lacked sufficient will power to choose
whether he would do the act or refrain from doing it". 65 (empha-
sis added).
The Delaware Code also provides that a person is not guilty of
an offense unless his guilt is predicated upon conduct which
includes a voluntary act,66 defined as a bodily movement per-
formed consciously or habitually as a result of effort or determi-
nation.67 Like California, the Delaware Code does provide
61. 11 DEL. CODE § 401 (Michie 1974); However, upon proper application for
a bifurcated trial, the judge may, at his discretion, grant the motion. Garrett v.
State, 320 A.2d 745 (1974).
62. State v. Johnson, 36 Del. 341, 175 A.669 (1934).
63. 11 DEL. CODE § 242 (Michie 1974) provides:
A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on
conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an
act which he is physically capable of performing.
11 DEL. CODE § 243 (Michie 1974) provides:
'Voluntary Act' means a bodily movement performed consciously or
habitually as a result of effort or determination, and includes posses-
sion if the defendant knowingly procured or received the thing pos-
sessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to
have been able to terminate his possession.
64. 11 DEL. CODE § 304 (Michie 1974), see note 10, supra for text.
65. 11 DEL. CODE § 401 (Michie 1974), see note 9, supra for text.
66. 11 DEL. CODE § 242 (Michie 1974), see note 63, supra for text.
67. 11 DEL. CODE § 243 (Michie 1974), see note 63, supra for text.
further help in determining the meaning of voluntariness.68
Similiarly, the commission of a crime requires a conscious de-
termination to commit the act. Underlying the rule is the philos-
ophy that everyone is held bound to contemplate and be respon-
sible for the natural consequences of his own voluntary act.69
Contemplation necessarily involves a knowledge of alternative
courses of action and a voluntary will to choose between them.
But if a person is insane under Delaware Law, he lacks the will
power to choose whether he would do the act or refrain from
doing it. His bodily movements are no longer necessarily per-
formed consciously or habitually as a result of effort or determi-
nation. The accused, if insane, does not have the capacity to
make a voluntary choice in his actions. Logically, therefore,
68. 11 DEL. CODE § 231 (Michie 1974), provides:
(a) 'Intentionally.' A person acts intentionally with respect to an ele-
ment of offense when:
(1) If the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result there-
of, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to
cause that result; and
(2) If the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware
of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they
exist.
(b) 'Knowingly.' A person acts knowingly with respect to an element
of his offense when:
(1) If the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and
(2) If the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause that result.
(c) 'Recklessly.' A person acts recklessly with respect to an element
of an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that the element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that
disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A
person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason
of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.
(d) 'Criminal negligence.' A person acts with criminal negligence
with respect to an element of an offense when he fails to perceive a
risk that the element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that failure to perceive it consti-
tutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the situation.
11 DEL. CODE § 232 (Michie 1974), provides:
'Elements of an offense' are those physical acts, attendant circum-
stances, results, and states of mind which are specifically included
within the definition of the offense or, if the definition is incomplete,
those states of mind which are supplied by the general provisions of
this Criminal Code. Facts establishing jurisdiction and venue and es-
tablishing that the offense was committed within the period prescribed
in § 205 of this Criminal'Code must also be proved as elements of the
offense.
69. State v. Johnson, 36 Del. 341, 175 A.669 (1934).
[Vol. 5:113, 1977] Proving Sanity or Insanity
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
since insanity precludes the requisite intent under Title 11 Sec-
tion 242 of the Delaware Code, and since the prosecution is
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material
element of the offense charged, it appears essential that once
the question of the defendant's sanity is put at issue, that the
prosecution prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt as a
necessary element of the crime.
As seen however, both California and Delaware, while accept-
ing the general common law idea of the necessity of intent in
defining criminal behavior, reject the relationship between san-
ity and intent. This is accomplished in either type jurisdiction by
never squarely confronting the issue. A later case in at least one
of these jurisdictions expressed regret with the rule.70 Arguably,
the mental element necessary to satisfy such intent statutes may
be presumed.7 1 The defense of insanity would not go to the
absence of such an intent, but would be directed at showing that
the defendant lacked the requisite mental capacity necessary to
make the infliction of punishment a moral act. Behind this
rationale is the policy decision that,
(S)anity is not an element of the crime, but rather, involves the ability
to understand and comprehend the right and wrong of the commis-
sion of the crime, a state of mentality which would render punishment
by way of confinement in a penal institution futile and would require
institutional confinement of a defendant for treatment rather than for
punishment. 72
70. State v. Murphy, 338 Mo. 291, 90 S.W.2d 103 (1936); The court stated it
would have been inclined to require the prosecution to carry the burden of
establishing sanity, if the question were new and open to judicial determination,
but did not so hold, believing itself constrained by a line of earlier rulings to the
contrary. Id. at 301, 108.
71. CAL. EVID. CODE § 665 (West 1968) provides:
A person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his volun-
tary act. This presumption is inapplicable in a criminal action to estab-
lish the specific intent of the defendant where specific intent is an
element of the crime charged.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 668 (West 1968) provides:
An unlawful intent is presumed from the doing of an unlawful act. This
presumption is inapplicable in a criminal action to establish the specif-
ic intent of the defendant where specific intent is an element of the
crime charged.
72. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 10, 268 A.2d 89, 94 (1970). This rea-
soning was adopted by Justice Rehnquist in a concurring opinion in Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) ("(E)vidence relevant to insanity as defined by State
law, may also be relevant to whether the required mens rea was present, the
existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to
the existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime"). Id.
at 705-06.
There is a fundamental contradiction in the universal require-
ment of a mens rea in union with an overt act, a state's definition
of insanity which precludes that intent, and a state's policy of
refusing to consider sanity as an element of the crime. There
appears no logical reason why the
(L)aw should discriminate against a defendant who was insane at the
time of the commission of the (criminal) act by casting upon him the
burden of establishing that defense by a preponderance of the evi-
dence while throwing the mantle of presumptive innocence around a
deliberate, calculating (criminal) as to other similar defenses. 73
Perhaps the best explanation of why sanity is not considered
an element of the crime in these jurisdictions can be seen in
Leland v. State,74 adopted as the controlling authority by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Rivera v. State.75 Leland76 in-
volved the constitutionality of an Oregon statute requiring the
defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
77
The law was upheld by the United States Supreme Court be-
cause it was unwilling to say that Oregon's determination of its
policy, with respect to the burden of proof on the issue of sanity
violated "(G)enerally accepted concepts of basic standards of
justice".78 The Court put great emphasis, however, on the fact
that the jury was told that the prosecution was required to prove
every element of the crime charged.79 In fact, the jury was in-
structed that the State had to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and only after finding the defendant guilty of homicide,
was the jury to consider the mental capacity of the defendant.80
Legal sanity was a separate issue per se and was set apart from
the offense charged. Although nominally acknowledging that
73. State v. Murphy, 338 Mo. 291,301, 90 S.W.2d 103, 108 (1936). The Missouri
Supreme Court illustrated that rationale with the following statement,
Suppose, for example, in such a case the defense were that the killing
was accidental, or in self-defense, or in necessarily overcoming resist-
ance to lawful arrest by an authorized conservator of the peace for
commission of a felony, etc.; or, in a prosecution for an assault by a
married woman, suppose the defense were that she acted under coer-
cion of her husband. In all these instances for the purposes of the
defensive plea the act of killing or assaulting would be admitted and
the denial would go only to the criminal intent; but under the law of this
state it could not be contended the accused must assume the burden of
proving himself, or herself, innocent by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Id. at 301, 108.
74. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
75. 351 A.3d 561 (1976).
76. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
77. 1940 Or. Laws § 26.926, the pertinent part of which provided, "when the
commission of the act charged as a crime is proven, and the defense sought to be
established is the insanity of the defendant, the same must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt .. "
78. 343 U.S. at 799.
79. Id. at 795.
80. Id.
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sanity is relevant during the guilt phase of trial, Delaware, like
Oregon and similar jurisdictions, implicitly adopt the same pro-
cedure as California does explicitly with its bifurcated trial. The
policy behind such bifurcation is identical to policy in Calif or-
nia.81 Like California, however, a policy decision should not be
justification for a defendant to be found guilty without proof of
all of the material elements of a crime. "The existence of a mens
rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to the principles of
Anglo-American Criminal jurisprudence". 82 Even jurisdictions
requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proving his insan-
ity accept this principle. Recognizing the fundamental require-
ment of a mens rea necessitates acknowledgement of the pri-
mary purpose that voluntariness of will has played in that con-
cept historically. As Blackstone wrote in his Commentaries:
(W)here there is no discernment, there is no choice; and where this is
no choice, there can be no act of the will, which is nothing else but a
determination of one's choice to do or to abstain from a particular
action: he, therefore, that has no understanding can have no will to
guide his conduct. 83
The fact that moral guilt was originally based upon freedom
of choice seems to have been overlooked in many instances
where the morality of the act was not at issue. In his concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Rudkin, in State v. Strasburg,84 recog-
nized that there could be little analogy between an individual
who was found guilty of a strict liability type offense and an
insane person who was not allowed to raise the issue of his
insanity to the offense charged.85 While the former may not have
had the knowledge of the criminality of his action, he does
intend to do the act and, as a free moral agent, has the power to
refrain from its commission until he determines the nature and
quality of such act. In the latter instance, the insane person does
not have the capacity to make such a determination before he
acts. While comprehending the nature of his acts, an insane
person may take life, destroy property or even choose means
singularly fitted to accomplish those ends and still not have the
81. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970).
82. Smith v. People, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
83. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book IV § 21
(4th ed. 1899).
84. 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
85. Id. at 128, 1027.
capacity to distinguish the quality of the act as to whether it is
right or wrong.8 6 The insane person is not a voluntary actor. "To
be guilty of a crime a person must engage responsibly in action.
Thus, an insane person who does the act is not guilty of the
crime." 8
7
The court's concern with the issue of sanity should not be with
whether the defendant is sufficiently morally blameworthy to
justify his punishment, but rather it should be at the guilt phase
of the trial to determine the defendant has the mental capacity
to commit the crime. Simply, the court must ask, did the defend-
ant have a free mind, voluntarily choosing evil rather than
good? Unless the question can be answered affirmatively at the
guilt phase of the trial, there can be no criminal liability. The
distinction between the morality of actions and a voluntary will
must be strongly emphasized. Moral blameworthiness is not
ascertained in a retrospective examination made after guilt has
been decided to determine the morality of punishment. Moral
blameworthiness, the mens rea, is a voluntary free will present
simultaneously with an overt act which must exist before guilt
can be found. When the common law spoke of the combination
of a vicious will with an overt act, as necessary elements of any
crime, it was not limiting the meaning of vicious will to immoral
acts. Quite the contrary, the emphasis was on the absence of the
capacity to choose freely between a good or an evil act. Only
where such capacity existed could the court then decide
whether an action was morally blameworthy.
88
Although the California-type jurisdictions and those profes-
sing the Delaware and Oregon view, appear to take different
approaches as to when the defendant's sanity becomes a deter-
minable issue, in reality, both achieve the same end, i.e., the
question of sanity is not addressed until the finder of fact has
determined that a crime has been committed. Both acknowl-
edge that before there can be a crime, both an intent and an
overt act must exist. But implicit in their presumption of sanity,
is a predetermination that the defendant has the requisite mens
rea. This rationale is directly contrary to the concept of criminal
intent adopted from the common law. While the morality of the
act is no longer of such primary importance, the key emphasis
remains on the exercise of a free will, i.e., the capability of
86. Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 225, 228-29, 78 N.W. 508, 509 (1899).
87. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
88. For an excellent discussion of the role of voluntariness in criminal
intent see Wasserstrom, H.L.A. Hart and the Doctrines of Mens Rea and Crim-
inal Responsibility, 35 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 92, 93-106 (1967).
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choosing voluntarily between alternative patterns of good and
evil behavior. Under the statutes examined defining insanity, a
person cannot, where he is insane, have this capacity. Without
the existence of voluntariness of action, the mental element of
crime is absent. Sanity, therefore, is a prerequisite to any crime.
A finding that a crime has been committed without a finding of
sanity is totally untenable and contradictory. There can be no
crime without sanity since without sanity no intent exists. Sani-
ty is, and has always been, an essential element in the commis-
sion of any crime requiring a mens rea. 89
III
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF PROOF BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT
As previously discussed, since intent, a free will to choose
between alternative modes of behavior, is an essential element
of every crime, the absence of such an intent precludes a finding
of guilt. Therefore, since the finding of insanity under a
McNaughton-type test excludes the presence of such an intent
by definition, the insane defendant cannot have the capacity to
commit crime. Once this proposition is established it is logically
necessary that the burden of proving the presence of criminal
intent, or the capacity of having such intent (sanity), if put in
issue, remains on the prosecution.90 Such was the argument of
dissenting Justice Brennan in Rivera:9 1
89. Whether this statement is applicable to strict liability crimes is unimpor-
tant. This analysis has been directed at crimes in which the mental element of
the offense has been historically recognized.
90. Note, The Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials-Burden of Proof, 10
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1037 (1976);
(I)n accordance with treatment given other 'affirmative' defenses, the
defendant should only be required to bring forth evidence tending to
show his insanity at the time of the commission of the offense, and
should not be required to bear the burden of persuasion.... Id. at
1048.
Hippard, Sr., The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault: An
Argument For a Constitutional Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REV.1039
(1973)
The defense of insanity inferentially rebuts the mens rea element of the
state's case. If mens rea is an essential element of the crime, the state
should have the burden of proving it beyond a reasonable doubt; there
is neither logic nor justice in shifting that burden of proof to a defend-
ant. It is the state that is supposed to justify use of the criminal sanction
before it deprives a citizen of his good name, his property and perhaps
his freedom. Id. at 1045, n. 30.
91. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
(T)he plea of insanity, whether or not the State chooses to characterize
it as an affirmative defense, relates to the accused's state of mind, an
essential element of the crime, and bears upon the appropriate form
of punishment .... We said in Mullaney that the requirement of
Winship that the State prove all elements of the crime was one of
substance, not limited to 'a State's definition of the elements of the
crime.. .92
The rationale for requiring the prosecution to prove the de-
fendant's sanity once it has been put in question was stated by
the United States Supreme Court, in the following terms:
(S)trictly speaking the burden of proof, as those words are understood
in criminal law, is never upon the accused to establish his innocence,
or to disprove the facts necessary to establish the crime for which he is
indicted. It is on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the
trial, and applies to every element necessary to constitute the crime
. . . . How, then upon principle, or consistently with humanity, can a
verdict of guilty be properly returned, if the jury entertains a rea-
sonable doubt as to the existence of a fact which is essential to guilt,
namely, the capacity in law of the accused to commit the crime?93
In Mullaney,9 4 a Maine statute required the defendant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the
heat of passion or sudden provocation to reduce the homicide
charged from murder to manslaughter. The Court, citing Speis-
er v. Randall,95 found that due process required the prosecution
to bear the burden of producing evidence proving beyond a
reasonable dout every element of the offense charged.96 The
federal courts97 and 28 other state courts98 currently apply this
rule in sanity cases. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice
Burger, argued, in his concurring opinion in Mullaney,99 that
Leland v. Oregon1 00 was not inconsistent with the holding in
Mullaney because: "(T)he issue of insanity as a defense to a
criminal charge was considered by the jury only after it had
found that all elements of the offense, including the mens rea, if
any, required by state law, had been proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt". 10 1 However, the defect in such reasoning has
already been shown. By definition the accused cannot have the
requisite mens rea if he is found -insane and the prosecution
must bear the burden of proving sanity along with all other
elements of a crime if requirements of due process are to be
met.
92. Id. at 227.
93. Davis v. United States, 106 U.S. 469, 487-88 (1895).
94. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
95. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
96. 421 U.S. at 701.
97. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
98. See note 4 supra.
99. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
100. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
101. 421 U.S. at 705, Justice Rehnquist concurring.
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Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional statute of the
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.0 2
In Re Winship'0 3 involved a 12 year old boy found to have
committed an act that, if done by an adult, would have con-
stituted a larceny. Although the juvenile judge acknowledged
that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, he rejected the defense counsel's contention that such
was required by the Fourteenth Amendment, and found the boy
guilty under a preponderance of the evidence standard. The
United States Supreme Court held, in reversing the conviction,
that it was incumbent upon the state to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt every element necessary to constitute the crime
charged. 1
04
In Morissette v. United States0 5 the Supreme Court found
that:
As we read the record, this case was tried on the theory that even if
criminal intent were essential its presence (a) should be decided by the
Court (b) as a presumption of law, apparently conclusive, (c) predi-
cated upon the isolated act of taking rather than upon all of the
circumstances. In each of these respects we believe the trial court was
in error.10
6
Judge Lay, speaking in Stump v. Bennett 0 7 for the Federal
Courts of the Eighth Circuit, found that "(W)hen the burden of
persuasion is shifted to the defendant to disprove essential ele-
ments of a crime, . . . then it is certain that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated". 0 8
In explaining why the prosecution must bear the burden of
proving all essential elements of a crime, the Supreme Court
replied:
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in
fact finding which both parties must take into account. Where one
party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the
102. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1969).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 364.
105. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
106. Id. at 273-74.
107. 398 F. 2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968).
108. Id. at 118.
process of placing on the other party the burden of producing a suffi-
ciency of proof in the first instance, and of his guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his
liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of producing the
evidence and convincing the fact finder of the guilt.10 9
Finally, in Davis, the Supreme Court, dealing with the ques-
tion of the burden or proof of sanity or insanity, said:
If the whole evidence, including that supplied by the presumption of
sanity, does not exclude beyond reasonable doubt the hypothesis of
sanity, of which some proof is adduced, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal of the specific offense charged. His guilt cannot be said to
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt-his will and his acts
cannot be held to have joined in perpetrating the murder charged
110
Plainly, due process requires that all states carry the responsi-
bility of proving all material elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, including the requisite intent. It follows that
since sanity can be a material factor in the existence of such an
intent, once the question of sanity is raised, due process neces-
sarily requires that the prosecution prove the defendant's sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt as one of the elements of the offense
charged.
IV
CONCLUSION
Jurisdictions such as Delaware,"' which excludes sanity as a
factor of criminal intent,"2 or such as California," 3 which em-
ploys a bifurcated trial procedure, do so because they hold the
existence or nonexistence of legal insanity as bearing no neces-
sary relationship with the existence or nonexistence of the re-
quired mental elements of a crime."4 This conclusion is an er-
roneous misconception of the true intent element of a crime at
common law. It is through this misconception of the intent ele-
ment of crime that these jurisdictions can acknowledge that a
person cannot be guilty of a crime without the union of an act
with a criminal intent,115 and, at the same time, either preclude a
defendant from asserting his insanity to show the absence of the
mens rea requirement at the guilt stage of trial," 6 or covertly
accomplish the same end by presuming evidence of insanity
109. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
110. 160 U.S. at 448.
111. 11 DEL. CODE §304 (Michie 1974)see note 10,supra for text.
112. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A. 2d 89 (1970).
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West Supp. 1977).
114. People v. Trouche, 206 Cal. 35, 47, 273 P. 767, 772 (1928).
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 20 (West 1972).
116. People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 P. 767 (1928).
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during the guilt phase of the trial as irrelevant in determining
whether an offense has been committed.
117
By failing to hear argument in Rivera v. State,"18 the Supreme
Court lost the opportunity to squarely confront the due process
requirements of proving sanity or insanity in such cases. By
summarily dismissing Rivera's appeal, the Court reaffirmed its
decision in Leland"' allowing the States to disassociate the
issue of sanity from the determination of the existence of the
mental element of a crime, In not hearing the case, the Court
could not reconsider the meaning of criminal intent. Had the
Court entertained this case, not only would the import of Le-
land have been reconsidered, but much of the confusion sur-
rounding intent and the relevancy of sanity would have been
resolved. These questions remain unanswered and will hopeful-
ly be addressed by the Court in the future. When such time
comes the Court should decide that since the concept of intent is
a necessary element of the crime, due process requires that once
the defendant's sanity is put in issue the prosecution must prove
such sanity beyond any reasonable doubt.
DANIEL K. SPRADLIN
117. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970).
118. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
119. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).

